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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

A THEMATIC APPROACH TO TEACHING CRIMINAL
ADJUDICATION
ADRIAAN LANNI* AND CAROL STEIKER**
A few years ago, I (Adriaan Lanni) decided to teach Criminal Adjudication
for the first time and approached my colleague Carol Steiker, who had taught
the course several times, for advice. It turned out that Carol had never been
entirely satisfied with the conventional criminal adjudication course, which
emphasizes federal constitutional doctrine and a chronological organization
(from “bail to jail”). We decided to collaborate on putting together a new
course, one that takes a more selective, thematic approach that uses a broader
range of materials to examine the operation of the criminal justice system. In
Part I, Carol Steiker describes and critiques the conventional approach to
teaching Criminal Adjudication. In Part II, we discuss our thematic and
problem-centered approach to the course. In Part III, Adriaan Lanni discusses
her experience teaching the new course. We include a sample syllabus as an
appendix.
I. THE CONVENTIONAL APPROACH AND ITS DISCONTENTS
Although there is surely variation in the teaching of Criminal Adjudication,
there appears to be a conventional approach that is marked by two
commitments: (1) a dominant focus on federal constitutional law and (2) a
chronological organization (from “bail to jail”). These conventions are visible
in the organization of most of the casebooks, treatises, and study aids on the
topic. Moreover, discussions with colleagues at other institutions suggest that
these conventions are widely followed in the classroom. I (Carol Steiker) have
used the conventional approach in teaching Criminal Adjudication every time I
have taught it since I joined the academy in 1992, including while teaching the
course jointly with my late colleague Bill Stuntz, whose own casebook largely
follows the conventional approach.1
The conventional approach is a product of both history and logic. The
constitutional focus of the conventional approach is a product of the “big

* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
** Henry J. Friendly Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
1. See RONALD JAY ALLEN, WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, DEBRA A.
LIVINGSTON & ANDREW D. LEIPOLD, COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (3d ed. 2011).
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bang” birth of criminal procedure courses in the 1960s and 1970s. The Warren
Court’s revolution in criminal procedure, when the Court incorporated
virtually all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights to apply to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, created a large quantity
of new constitutional law regulating state criminal processes. This new body of
controversial, ever-changing constitutional doctrine soon grew too large and
complex to fit into traditional courses on constitutional law. Hence, new
courses were born to address this burgeoning area of constitutional regulation.
As intuited by the directors of the hit television series Law & Order, it makes
sense to divide the world of criminal justice into the separate jurisdictions of
police investigations and criminal prosecutions. Consequently, most schools
eventually adopted two separate courses, one on the constitutional constraints
on police practices and the other on the constitutional doctrines that structure
the adjudicative process. The adjudication course deals with a hodgepodge of
issues that do not have the same degree of thematic unity as police practices
do. Moreover, many teachers of the adjudication course come to the academy
after having worked as prosecutors or defense lawyers in the litigation
trenches. Hence, logic seems to compel a chronological approach to the
adjudicative process, organizing the constitutional issues in the order in which
they are confronted over the course of litigating a criminal case.
There is much to be said for a chronological, largely constitutional course
on the adjudicative process. A constitutional focus can be defended because
the federal Constitution governs all across the country and marks the floor
above which state legislation (and state constitutional law) must operate. And
chronological organization simply makes intuitive sense; it feels familiar to
litigators and is easy for students to follow. In my years of teaching Criminal
Adjudication along these lines, I felt that I was offering students a valuable
educational experience. And yet, I also always felt vaguely dissatisfied with
the course. When a younger colleague (Adriaan Lanni) approached me to talk
about teaching the course for the first time, I finally systematically reflected on
my experience with the course, and came to see and articulate some of the
pitfalls of the conventional approach.
First, a constitutional focus inevitably leads to too much emphasis on
constitutional doctrine to the detriment of systemic understanding. I found
myself spending too much time, for example, teaching about the scope of the
constitutional right to counsel (Gideon v. Wainwright2 and its progeny) and the
doctrine of ineffective assistance of counsel (Strickland v. Washington3 and its
progeny) instead of the structural impediments to providing adequate indigent
defense services. Although the Supreme Court cases contain soaring language
about the importance of the right to counsel as the vehicle through which all
2. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
3. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
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other rights are asserted,4 constitutional law does not provide enough of a
window to understand the problems plaguing indigent defense in the United
States. Inadequate funding, docket pressures, lack of independence from the
judiciary, and other structural issues are at the root of the perennial crisis in
indigent defense. Understanding the variety of state and local funding
mechanisms, as well as the variety of structures for the appointment,
supervision, and training of defense counsel, is at least as crucial to
understanding “the right to counsel” as, say, Strickland’s two-part test.
However, a constitutional focus can create pressure to overemphasize doctrine
and underemphasize context; one can feel the students’ restlessness at the shift
from black letter law to descriptive social science, which feels “soft” and
unlikely to be tested on a traditional law school final exam.
Second, the traditional approach—the combination of a constitutional
focus and a chronological organization—produces a course that
overemphasizes the trial as the central feature of the American criminal justice
system. There is a lot of constitutional law about trials—about jury selection,
speedy trials, confrontation, cross-examination, and the like—that creates a
misleading sense of the significance of the jury trial as a mechanism of case
disposition. Once one commits to a chronological survey of constitutional law,
one feels pressure to provide “coverage” of the issues commensurate to their
constitutional significance, which is generally measured by the play that the
issues get in the Supreme Court. However, constitutional significance is not a
good proxy for systemic significance. For example, the Supreme Court has
given a great deal of attention to race discrimination in jury selection (in
Batson v. Kentucky5 and its progeny) and to the constitutional right to confront
witnesses at trial (in Crawford v. Washington6 and its progeny). However, in
an era in which fewer than five percent of cases are resolved by trial, it simply
does not make sense to emphasize trial rights at the expense of understanding
the system of plea bargaining, which is the dominant mode of adjudication.
Yet I would wager that trial rights take up a much greater share of most
criminal adjudication courses than does plea bargaining—and the
responsibility for this state of affairs lies largely with the conventional
approach to the course.
Third, the pressure for “coverage” of the most important constitutional
issues from “bail to jail” not only over-emphasizes the trial but also creates
pressure to include doctrinally complex issues that simply are not that
important relative to other things that might be studied. For example, most
criminal adjudication casebooks include significant coverage of the law of
4. E.g., Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344–45 (concluding the right to counsel is so “fundamental”
that it is “essential to fair trials”).
5. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84–87 (1986).
6. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004).
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double jeopardy, which has been reconsidered by the Supreme Court multiple
times, and, as a consequence, is highly complex and doctrinally difficult. The
Court’s interest notwithstanding, double jeopardy is an issue whose systemic
importance does not match the time necessary to master it. In contrast, the
problem of innocence in the criminal justice system—the conditions that
produce wrongful convictions and possible remedies for them—does not have
an obvious constitutional doctrinal “hook” and thus can end up getting short
shrift in a conventional criminal adjudication course. Here, too, I would wager
that most criminal adjudication courses spend more time on double jeopardy
than on the causes of wrongful convictions.
Finally, a chronological constitutional survey from “bail to jail” lacks
thematic coherence. It is hard to come up with themes that link such disparate
topics as preventive detention, jury selection, double jeopardy, and standards
for appellate review. Of course, not everyone who teaches Criminal
Adjudication includes exactly the same mix of topics. For example, I included
in my syllabus the topics of fair trial/free press and defendant competency,
which Bill Stuntz did not. And Bill Stuntz included in his syllabus the topics of
confrontation and habeas corpus, which I did not. However, both of our
conventional syllabi presented similar problems with regard to thematic
coherence. The pressure that the conventional approach exerts toward
comprehensive coverage of constitutional issues at every stage of the criminal
process inevitably will produce syllabi that contain a jumble of issues that do
not speak to one another—nor to the most pressing problems of the criminal
justice system.
II. A LESS CONVENTIONAL APPROACH
Mindful of some of the pitfalls of the conventional approach, we (Adriaan
Lanni and Carol Steiker) collaborated to create a new criminal adjudication
syllabus that would resist the conventional approach’s commitment to
comprehensive, chronological coverage of constitutional law. This new
approach offers a set of curated themes instead of a comprehensive or strictly
chronological approach, and promotes engagement with wide-ranging
readings, real-life case studies, and visiting speakers that augment a much
scaled-back consideration of constitutional doctrine.
A.

Themes

Instead of starting with the initial appearance and ending with appellate
and post-conviction review (i.e. instead of the comprehensive chronological
approach), we decided to be selective about the themes covered, scaling back
to eight themes from the eighteen or so topics that I (Carol Steiker) covered in
my conventional course. Some of the themes we chose—such as “counsel,”
“charging,” and “the jury”—are familiar topics that no doubt would appear on
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any conventional syllabus as well. Moreover, we chose to order some of our
themes in a chronological fashion, with “charging” preceding “plea
bargaining,” and “plea bargaining” preceding “sentencing,” for example.
Despite these apparent similarities to the conventional approach, our
thematic approach diverges more substantially from a conventional syllabus
than a superficial glance at our themes might suggest. First, our thematic
approach allowed us to leave out many topics that are often included in a
chronological survey of constitutional issues. For example, we did not include
consideration of the initial appearance, the right to a speedy trial,
confrontation, cross-examination, compulsory process, prosecutorial argument,
double jeopardy, appellate review, or habeas corpus. Our thematic syllabus
simply makes no pretense at comprehensive coverage of constitutional issues
in the criminal process, which frees up time to go deeper and to go well
beyond constitutional doctrine on the selected themes.
Second, the syllabus diverges significantly from a chronological
organization. The first theme on the syllabus—“counsel”—gets extended
treatment that includes materials not only on the right to representation at trial
and during plea bargaining but also on appeal, as well as materials on post-trial
review for effectiveness of counsel, and an in-depth look at structural reform
litigation and other avenues to address systemic problems in the funding and
delivery of indigent defense services. This systemic focus pervades our
thematic approach with the conscious intent that the students see each theme
not as a successive “stage” of the criminal process, but rather as a facet of a
complex and interwoven “system” of criminal justice. The biggest divergence
from a chronological approach comes in the last theme in the syllabus,
“Outcomes: Racial Effects and the Problem of Innocence.” The problems of
discrimination and wrongful conviction pervade the entire criminal process and
are the cumulative product of choices made all along the way from “bail to
jail.” By explicitly naming “outcomes” as a theme, we deliberately step away
from a focus on procedure to consider systemic effects.
In short, our thematic approach not only streamlines and deepens
consideration of the chosen topics, it does so in a way that signals that the
course is not one on “constitutional criminal procedure,” as the conventional
approach would have it; rather, it is a course about adjudication within our
criminal justice system.
B.

A Problem-Centered Approach

The second innovation was to include coverage of important topics that are
not fully addressed by Supreme Court doctrine. In many instances, we used a
problem-centered approach, offering doctrinal and non-doctrinal readings, and
discussion questions to address a particular issue—for example, the funding of
indigent defense counsel, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, racial
impacts, and innocence—rather than using the case law to organize these
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topics. In some instances, this involved relatively minor reframing and
supplementation of the traditional doctrinal readings. In others, we made room
in the syllabus for topics that are traditionally not covered or covered only
briefly. And in some cases, we created substantially new material. For
example, we engaged a writer from the Harvard Law School Case Studies
Program to help us develop a case study of the charging and plea bargaining
process in the Aaron Swartz prosecution.7 We also brought in a number of
visiting speakers to address emerging issues.
One relatively minor change was to begin each topic with policy-based
readings rather than begin with a case and fold in policy questions as part of
the discussion/critique of the case. For example, rather than jumping right into
the case law on the right to counsel, we introduced this topic by comparing the
current methods of providing counsel for indigent defendants with potential
alternatives, like voucher systems. While these topics are typically discussed in
criminal adjudication classes, getting the students in the mindset of thinking
about the status quo and its alternatives placed these policy questions on an
equal footing with the standard doctrinal topics that we also covered. In some
cases, the problem-oriented framing suggested new questions for discussion.
For example, we briefly considered alternatives to our charging system,
including historical examples of private prosecution systems. We also assigned
a reality TV show of a French homicide prosecution to give an example of a
more inquisitorial-style civil law system.
The problem-centered approach also led us to include material for some of
our themes that are absent or mentioned only briefly in the notes in most
casebooks. We devoted a day to systemic challenges to underfunding of
indigent defense counsel. In addition to discussing representative cases, we
invited speakers involved in current systemic litigation: the first year, Steve
Hanlon talked about his lawsuit challenging Missouri’s system of funding
counsel for the indigent; the next year, Steve Bright discussed a similar case in
Georgia. As part of our sentencing topic, we devoted part of a day to the
problem of “debtor’s prisons,” discussing Bearden v. Georgia8 (which is
mentioned only in a note in the casebook we used) and the Department of
Justice’s report on the Ferguson Police Department.9 We also discussed

7. For a description of the problems this case presented, see ADRIAAN LANNI, CAROL
STEIKER & ELIZABETH MORONEY, PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN CHARGING AND PLEA
BARGAINING: THE AARON SWARTZ CASE (A) (June 2014), http://casestudies.law.harvard.edu/
prosecutorial-discretion-in-charging-and-plea-bargaining-the-aaron-swartz-case-a/ [http://perma.
cc/JG9J-9RVC] (click on “Add to Cart” and follow steps for free download of the PDF
publication).
8. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 664, 667–68 (1983).
9. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT 42–43, 100 (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-re
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problem-solving approaches to sentencing through readings and speakers. One
year, a judge spoke about drug and mental health courts; in another, we had a
speaker from a local restorative justice community-police partnership.
A major impetus behind the course innovation was our sense that
constitutional doctrine did not adequately address the process of charging and
plea bargaining. In a world of guilty pleas, the prosecutor’s determinations of
what to charge and what bargain to offer are the ball game, yet the case law
regulates this process only minimally. Whether they become prosecutors or
defense lawyers, students who hope to work in the criminal justice system
must understand the process of charging and plea bargaining. While some
casebooks provide short charging problems, we wanted an in-depth case study
that would allow the students to role-play the entire charging and bargaining
process in a case. We chose the Aaron Swartz prosecution because information
about successive plea offers, as well as details about the alleged crime and the
defendant, were readily available. Of course, Aaron Swartz is far from a
typical defendant. But the public controversy over his prosecution and the
criminal penalties authorized under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act10
invited a lively discussion about the extent to which the case was or was not
representative of more ordinary prosecutions. The case study teaching plan
(available with the case study from the Harvard Law School Case Studies
Program11) calls for students to play the role of either the prosecutor or defense
attorney at a series of decision points, such as each charging decision and plea
offer. At each decision point, students are asked to articulate the considerations
that may have led the prosecutor or defense counsel to a particular position,
and whether they would have taken a different approach.
Two of our themes—race and innocence—are not typically taught as
stand-alone topics.12 The readings we put together on racial impacts included
both cases (United States v. Armstrong13 and McCleskey v. Kemp14) and
secondary readings, including material on statistical disparities in the criminal
justice system, implicit bias research, and portions of Michelle Alexander’s
The New Jim Crow.15 The class on innocence focused less on doctrine than on
the sources of error in false convictions and related reform proposals. Teaching
race and innocence as independent topics, instead of talking about them briefly
leases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report_1.pdf [http://perma.cc/T7RGC9SH] [hereinafter DOJ INVESTIGATION].
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2013).
11. LANNI, STEIKER & MORONEY, supra note 7.
12. See Cynthia Lee, Making Black and Brown Lives Matter: Incorporating Race Into the
Criminal Procedure Curriculum, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 481 (2016).
13. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464–65 (1996).
14. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1987).
15. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (2012).
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and intermittently in the course of the standard tour of the case law, allows
students to analyze these problems more openly and comprehensively. This
approach encourages discussion of which doctrinal and structural features play
the greatest role in problematic criminal justice outcomes, and which reform
proposals would be likely to have the greatest impact.
III. WHAT WORKED AND WHAT DIDN’T
I (Adriaan Lanni) have taught the redesigned Criminal Adjudication class
twice. Although a thematic approach inevitably necessitates some trade-offs,
my impression is that the new course is more cohesive and gives our students a
better understanding of criminal adjudication than the more traditional “bail to
jail” approach. However, the course is still very much a work in progress. Here
are some thoughts on what worked, what could be improved, and some things
to keep in mind for those who are considering adopting this approach.
Most obviously, the thematic approach comes at the cost of eliminating a
fair amount of doctrine. I did not cover double jeopardy or the right to a speedy
trial at all. Although we read Blakely v. Washington,16 we did not study the
various twists and turns of the Apprendi17 doctrine in detail. Some students
accustomed to courses that focus on doctrine and assignments exclusively from
a casebook were surprised to see the amount of supplemental reading in the
syllabus. I found that it was helpful to explain the rationale behind the course
in the first class so that students understood why the syllabus was
unconventional. This introduction also gave them fair warning that the nondoctrinal materials were important and would be discussed in class and tested
on the exam. One drawback is that editing down the secondary sources to
capture only the important ideas and evidence takes a significant amount of
time; we definitely assigned too much reading and plan to do more editing,
particularly of the law review articles, in the future.
The Swartz case study was a highlight of the course. Initially, I was a bit
skeptical about the value of the case study method, but this approach is very
well suited to analyzing prosecution and defense perspectives during the
charging and bargaining process. The entire class was engaged throughout, and
the discussion was much more nuanced and specific than the general
discussions about prosecutorial discretion I tend to see in my substantive
criminal law class. One challenge with this case study was ensuring a balanced
discussion. Some students felt very strongly that the prosecution was improper.
Although a defense of the prosecution’s point of view came through during the
role-play, only a few students were willing to express their agreement with any
of the prosecution’s bargaining positions. I suspect that there was more

16. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
17. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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sympathy for the prosecution’s tactics among the students than was voiced. I
am considering using clickers to anonymously poll students both at the
beginning and end of discussion of each decision point. If I am right that the
students’ views of the case were more divided than it appeared, the anonymous
polls might encourage students holding minority views to speak up.
The students reacted most positively to the inclusion of emerging issues,
such as “debtors’ prisons” and systemic litigation related to indigent defense
funding. They commented that these topics made the class seem more relevant
and connected to current developments on the ground. Several students
expressed gratitude that the class included discussion of the prosecutor’s
handling of the grand jury investigation of the shooting of Michael Brown in
Ferguson and the Department of Justice’s Ferguson Report,18 which was
published while the course was being taught. The course’s thematic approach
made it possible to integrate discussion of such important current issues
without having it seem like a digression from the normal business of the class.
The visiting speakers, some of whom attended in person, while others
spoke via videoconference, also helped bridge the gap between Supreme Court
doctrine and recent developments. Since a significant amount of class time is
handed over to visiting speakers, it is vital to choose speakers who are
thoughtful about their work and are open to discussing criticisms of their
points of view. One of our best sessions was on restorative justice, in large part
because the speaker (clearly an excellent facilitator!) openly encouraged the
students to critique the specifics of her program as well as the restorative
justice approach more generally. Another potential drawback of visitors is that
their schedules do not always allow them to visit the class on a particular day,
which may make it necessary to rearrange the syllabus and split up themes.
The racial impacts topic was set for the end of the course. It was
successful, though it did involve some compromises elsewhere in the syllabus.
Including Armstrong19 under this theme meant that we did not read this
important case during our earlier discussion of prosecutorial discretion. And it
might have been helpful for the students to have read about implicit bias
research earlier on in the term. Although we discussed race in conjunction with
doctrine many times over the course of the class, I sometimes felt as though I
was holding back a broader discussion on this topic until we reached the racial
impacts section of the syllabus. Nevertheless, as we discussed earlier, this
approach did foster a more comprehensive discussion of the problem and
potential reforms. This topic also helped tie the topics of the course together by
inviting students to reconsider the various stages of the criminal process.
The thematic, problem-oriented approach to teaching the course affected
the way that students demonstrated their mastery of the material on the final
18. DOJ INVESTIGATION, supra note 9.
19. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464–65 (1996).
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exam. The exam included a doctrinal fact pattern, an essay, and a set of
“identifications” that required students to identify and discuss the significance
of short quotations from cases and other course readings. Some of the
identifications explicitly tested non-doctrinal material, but the exam did not
look all that different from a conventional criminal adjudication exam.
However, I did find that the students’ answers to the identification and essay
questions were different from what I would expect in a conventional course.
Students’ discussions of the significance of a doctrinal test, for example,
tended to be broader and include the holding’s implications for the system as a
whole as well as for the specific area of legal doctrine. And the answers to the
essay questions were significantly more sophisticated and thoughtful than what
I normally see in other courses. Both the experience of teaching the course and
the student mastery demonstrated on the final exam have encouraged me to
continue to use a thematic, problem-oriented approach to criminal
adjudication.
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APPENDIX
CRIMINAL ADJUDICATION SAMPLE SYLLABUS20
I.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

1.

INTRODUCTION
Excerpt from Stephen Bright & Sia Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and
Resistance After Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150 (2013)
Excerpt from Heather P. Baxter, Gideon’s Ghost: Providing the Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel in Times of Budgetary Crisis, 2010
MICH. ST. L. REV. 341
Excerpt from Carol Steiker, Gideon at Fifty: A Problem of Political
Will, 122 YALE L.J. 2694 (2013)
Excerpt from Cara H. Drinan, Getting Real About Gideon: The Next
Fifty Years of Enforcing the Right to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1309 (2013)
Excerpt from Adam Liptak, Need-Blind Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4,
2014
Powell v. Alabama
Gideon v. Wainwright

2.

THE SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL
Argersinger v. Hamlin; Scott v. Illinois
Gagnon v. Scarpelli; In re Gault
Ross v. Moffit
Excerpt from John P. Gross, What Matters More? A Day in Jail or a
Criminal Conviction?, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 55 (2013)
Excerpt from Stephanos Bibas, Shrinking Gideon and Expanding
Alternatives to Lawyers, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1287 (2013)

20. Each numbered topic is meant to take roughly one 1.5-hour class period. Most criminal
procedure textbooks include edited versions of the majority of the cases in this syllabus and
would work for this class.
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INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL PART 1
A. Assessing Counsel’s Effectiveness
Strickland v. Washington
Rompilla v. Beard
Bobby v. Van Hook
Excerpts from Carol Steiker, Gideon’s Problematic Promises, 143
DAEDALUS 51 (2014)

4.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL PART 2
B. Assessing Prejudice
Lockhart v. Fretwell; Glover v. United States
C. Strickland and Guilty Pleas
Padilla v. Kentucky
Missouri v. Frye
Lafler v. Cooper
D. Per Se Ineffectiveness
Cronic; Bell v. Cone

5.

SYSTEMIC CHALLENGES/REFORMS TO INDIGENT DEFENSE COUNSEL
SYSTEMS
(Guest speaker involved in current systemic reform litigation)
Excerpt from Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense
Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 427 (2009)
Hurrell-Harring v. State of New York
Lavallee v. Justices in Hampden Superior Court
State ex rel. Missouri Public Defender Commission v. Waters
Excerpt from ABA, “The Missouri Project: A Study of the Missouri
Public Defender System and Attorney Workload Standards” (2014)

6.

THE RIGHT TO CONFLICT-FREE REPRESENTATION; THE RIGHT TO SELFREPRESENTATION
A. The Right to Conflict-Free Representation
Holloway v. Arkansas
Cuyler v. Sullivan; Burger v. Kemp; Mickens v. Taylor
Wheat v. United States
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B. Right to Self-Representation
Faretta v. California
United States v. Kaczynski
II.

BAIL AND PREVENTIVE DETENTION

7.

BAIL AND PREVENTATIVE DETENTION
Listen to/read NPR report: “Behind the Bail Bond System”
Excerpts from Vera Institute of Justice, “Fair Treatment of the Indigent:
The Manhattan Bail Project”
Summary of Bail Reform Act of 1984
United States v. Dreier
United States v. Salerno

III.

CHARGING, PLEA BARGAINING, AND THE GRAND JURY

8.

THE COMPARISON TO CIVIL SYSTEMS; THE PROSECUTORIAL DECISION
WHETHER TO CHARGE
Watch: 30-minute reality TV show depicting a homicide prosecution in
France (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u9ttrUx-5tE)
Attica v. Rockefeller
Ari Phillips, “How Two Guys, a Lobster Boat, and a District Attorney
Made Climate History” (2014)
(http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2014/ 09/10/3565445/lobster-boatdistrict-attorney-climate-history/)
Excerpts from William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s
Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004)
Excerpts from Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing
of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV.
869 (2009)

9.

THE GRAND JURY AND SCREENING
Costello v. United States
United States v. Williams
Excerpts from Niki Kuckes, The Democratic Prosecutor: Explaining the
Constitutional Function of the Federal Grand Jury, 94 GEO. L.J.
1265 (2006)
Excerpts from Adriaan Lanni, Implementing the Neighborhood Grand
Jury, in GRAND JURY 2.0: MODERN PERSPECTIVES ON THE GRAND
JURY (Roger Fairfax ed., 2010)
Excerpts from media accounts and transcripts from State of Missouri v.
Darren Wilson grand jury proceedings
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THE GRAND JURY AND INVESTIGATIONS
(Assistant U.S. Attorney guest speaker)
United States v. Dionisio
United States v. R. Enterprises
ABA proposed grand jury reforms

11.

PLEA BARGAINING
Excerpts from Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of
Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004)
Excerpts from Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as
Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992)
Excerpts from Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1037 (1984)
Brady v. United States
United States v. Kupa
Bordenkircher v. Hayes
United States v. Pollard
United States v. Ruiz
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11

12.

PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN CHARGING AND PLEA BARGAINING:
THE AARON SWARTZ CASE
Harvard Law School Case Studies Program, The Aaron Swartz Case
Study

IV.

DISCOVERY

13.

DISCOVERY PART 1
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16; Jencks Act
Arizona v. Youngblood
Williams v. Florida
Taylor v. Illinois

14.

DISCOVERY PART 2
The Brady Rule (Brady; Agurs; Bagley; Kyles v. Whitley)
Excerpts from Ellen Yaroshefsky, Why Do Brady Violations Happen?:
Cognitive Bias and Beyond, CHAMPION, May 2013
Excerpts from Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against
Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV.
693 (1987)
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Excerpts from Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84
IND. L.J. 481 (2009)
Proposed Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act
Excerpts from Brian P. Fox, An Argument Against Open-File Discovery
in Criminal Cases, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 425 (2013)
V.

JURY

15.

THE JURY RIGHT
Duncan v. Louisiana
Jury size (Williams; Ballew)
Unanimity (Apodaca)
Excerpts from Michael Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About
How Juries (Should) Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1
(1997)

16.

JURY SELECTION AND COMPOSITION
Duren v. Missouri
Batson v. Kentucky
Powers v. Ohio; Georgia v. McCollum; J.E.B. v. Alabama
Purkett v. Elem; Hernandez v. New York
Excerpt from Jeffrey B. Abramson, Two Ideals of Jury Deliberation,
1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 125
Excerpts from Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson’s
Net to Ensnare More Than the Unapologetically Bigoted or
Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1075 (2011)
Excerpts from Lucy Fowler, Gender and Jury Deliberations: The
Contributions of Social Science, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1
(2005)

17.

JURY DELIBERATIONS AND VERDICT; PRETRIAL PUBLICITY
A. Jury Deliberations and Verdict
Tanner v. United States
United States v. Thomas
Excerpts from Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black
Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995)
B. Pretrial Publicity
Skilling v. United States
In re Tsarnaev
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VI.

SENTENCING

18.

COURTS VS. LEGISLATURES VS. JURIES; DISCRETIONARY VS.
GUIDELINES APPROACHES
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Williams v. New York
Brief description of Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Excerpts from Frank O. Bowman III, The Failure of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
1315 (2005)
Excerpts from Judge James S. Gwin, Juror Sentiment on Just
Punishment: Do the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Reflect
Community Values?, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 173 (2010)
Excerpts from Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52
DUKE L.J. 951 (2003)
Excerpts from Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, 40
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 359 (2005)
19.

LIMITS ON JUDICIAL SENTENCING
A. Apprendi and Its Progeny
Apprendi v. New Jersey
Blakely v. Washington
Kimbrough; Gall
B. Fines and Probation
Bearden v. Georgia
Excerpts from DOJ Ferguson Report
Excerpt from Note, Policing and Profit, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1723 (2015)

20.

RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
(Guest speaker from restorative justice community-police partnership)
Excerpts from HOWARD ZEHR, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE (2002)
Proposed MA Senate Act 1001 “An Act Promoting Restorative Justice
Practices”

VIII. OUTCOMES: RACIAL EFFECTS AND THE PROBLEM OF
INNOCENCE
21.

RACIAL EFFECTS
Excerpts from Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59
UCLA L. REV. 1124 (2012)
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Excerpts from Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of
Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795 (2012)
Excerpt from MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012)
McCleskey v. Kemp
Excerpts from Randall Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital
Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388
(1988)
United States v. Armstrong
22.

SENTENCING AND RACIAL DISPARITY
(Guest speaker from The Sentencing Project)
Excerpts from Marc Mauer, Addressing Racial Disparities in
Incarceration, 91 PRISON J. 87S (2011)
Excerpts from U.S. Sentencing Commission, Report to Congress:
Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice
System (2011)
Excerpts from Marc Mauer, Racial Impact Statements: Changing
Policies to Address Disparities, 23 CRIM. JUST. 16 (2008)

23.

INNOCENCE
(Guest speaker from an innocence project)
Excerpts from National Registry of Exonerations Report (2014)
Excerpts from Steven Krieger, Why Our Justice System Convicts
Innocent People and the Challenges Faced by Innocence Projects
Trying to Exonerate Them, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 333 (2011)
Excerpts from Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 55 (2008)
Excerpts from BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT:
WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (2011)

24.

EVALUATIONS OF THE SYSTEM AND PROSPECTS FOR REFORM
Excerpts from Judge Harvie Wilkinson III, In Defense of American
Criminal Justice, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1099 (2014)
Excerpts from WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011)
Excerpts from the Honorable Patti B. Saris, A Generational Shift for
Federal Drug Sentences, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2015)
Excerpts from Sentencing Project, “The State of Sentencing 2014”
(2014)
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